TheSwanseaSchool.org

Rush Rhees was a remarkable thinker whose intellectual pursuits and personal life were inextricably entwined. A close friend and literary trustee of Ludwig Wittgenstein, he forged his own unique path, writing incessantly yet releasing very little for public view during his lifetime. Born in 19 March 1905 in Rochester, New York, he found himself part of a family that had a fervent commitment to social advancement and radical ideas. His great‐great‐grandfather, Morgan John Rhys, was a zealous Welsh minister who spoke out vehemently against slavery before relocating to America to found a Welsh community. His son, Rush Rhees’s father, Benjamin Rush Rhees, became an eminent university president who founded what is now celebrated as the Rush Rhees Library at Rochester.

Notwithstanding such distinguished lineage, Rhees’s academic journey was somewhat chequered. A student for two years at Rochester University, he clashed so vehemently with a philosophy professor that his eventual expulsion made headline news. Labelled an irreligious radical, he set off for Edinburgh in 1924, where Norman Kemp Smith oversaw much of his academic progress. Kemp Smith, who remarked on Rhees’s resemblance to “the young Shelley,” perceived him as more interested in feelings in his writings rather than systematic critique. Nevertheless, Rhees treasured frankness and accepted Kemp Smith’s admonition that the unbridled emotion in his essays required reworking. Ultimately, he earned a first‐class honours degree in Mental Philosophy and was awarded the illustrious Vans Dunlop Scholarship.

By 1928, Rhees became Assistant Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester under the guidance of J. L. Stocks. Although he taught in a diverse range of courses, he refrained from publishing, instead dedicating his time to studying the writings of philosophers L. Nelson and Jakob Fries. It was also during this period that Rhees encountered John Anderson, whose formidable influence helped shape his political outlook. At one juncture, he allied himself with the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party, but after Wittgenstein cautioned him that inflexible party commitments might undermine his philosophical openness, his focus became more academic than political.

In pursuit of further intellectual enrichment, Rhees went to Innsbruck in 1932, where Alfred Kastil introduced him to Franz Brentano’s theory of relations. Kastil later recounted how their roles were inverted: Rhees, ostensibly the pupil, contributed fresh insights to his mentor on a daily basis. Soon after, he relocated to Cambridge to work with G. E. Moore, whose assessments described Rhees as remarkably gifted. Yet, once more, he declined to submit a dissertation, steadfastly insisting he had produced “nothing fit for publication.” Such unusual humility—or perhaps self-chastisement—prompted him to wander over several years between short-lived academic roles and non-scholarly ventures, despite the warm accolades offered by figures such as Moore, Kastil, and John Anderson, all of whom recognized his extraordinary abilities.

Rhees initially crossed paths with Wittgenstein at Cambridge in the 1930s, igniting a friendship that would become important for both. Rhees prized Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach highly, while Wittgenstein appreciated Rhees’s straightforward candour. In 1940, Rhees took a provisional assistant lectureship at Swansea University, leaving behind his welding job. With World War II creating acute staff shortages, he taught classes spanning logic, psychology, Descartes, Kant, Plato, and beyond. Over time, colleagues recognized Rhees' unique capabilities and pressed for a permanent appointment. Throughout his career at Swansea, Rhees persistently declined promotions—at one point assuming a senior lectureship only to smooth the transition for a new professor before relinquishing the post to avoid hierarchical entanglements.

During his tenure at Swansea, Rhees wielded a profound influence. He established a Philosophical Society that convened weekly, where he commonly initiated discussions with incisive questions that struck at the very core of a speaker’s argument. Those who offered sweeping assertions soon found their views rigorously examined, yet when genuine confusion or uncertainty emerged, his patience was boundless. Rhees would often later compose long, typed letters expanding upon his reflections—some of which appeared in Without Answers (1969), a volume of essays published in his later years. Another collection, Discussions of Wittgenstein (1970), showcased his penetrating insights into continuity and philosophical logic, revealing the depth of his own intellectual approach.

Emulating his teacher Wittgenstein, Rhees taught pupils without the use of notes, grappling openly with ideas as if he were encountering them for the first time. He cultivated a deep appreciation of Plato, convinced that many of the ideas present in those dialogues resurfaced in Wittgenstein’s subsequent insights into language. Additionally, he edited George Boole’s Studies in Logic and Probability (1977), providing exhaustive notes that displayed his proficiency in formal reasoning. Rhees rarely made his own reflections public however, continuously asserting that he had produced “nothing worthy of publication.” In truth, he had already expanded Wittgenstein’s scholarly heritage by helping shape texts that would later become indispensable in Wittgenstein’s posthumous oeuvre. Indeed, Wittgenstein designated Rhees one of his three literary executors, tasking them with depositing his papers in Trinity College, Cambridge.

Beyond Swansea, Rhees kept in touch with eminent philosophers like Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch, who held his unwavering honesty in high regard. Former students recounted how a single penetrating question from him could expose a theory’s flaws, yet he would often spend hours in subsequent discussion to illuminate a constructive way forward. Convinced that philosophy formed a single, interconnected domain, he integrated conceptual clarification in logic, ethical theory, metaphysical inquiry, aesthetics, and political reflection into one coherent human domain. In keeping with that belief, Rhees often revisited questions concerning the unity of language. Rather than seeking a rigid formal structure, he argued that language derives meaning from its practical use and the evolution of discourse.

Rhees had a profound aversion to dogmatism, always challenging misconceptions and ambiguities wherever they surfaced, while firmly rejecting any claim to authoritative theory. This reluctance to systematise his own views rendered him a formidable interlocutor in free-flowing discussion. When he was eventually persuaded to publish certain essays, Rhees directed the royalties toward student awards, declining any personal gain. Indeed, his life was marked by unwavering generosity—whether by offering financial aid to students or by devoting countless hours to help them navigate intricate questions.

In his landmark essay “Wittgenstein’s Builders”(1960), Rhees famously critiques Wittgenstein’s analogy of language as a set of distinct “games,” contending that this comparison obscures language’s integrated, conversational essence. Although Wittgenstein’s “builders” example (Philosophical Investigations, §19) illustrates how words acquire meaning through specific tasks, Rhees maintained that the scenario oversimplifies the nature of speech. It demonstrates only a narrow function, overlooking how genuine conversation permits deviation, clarification, and creative exploration when challenges arise or novel ideas surface. Unlike a chess match—governed solely by external rules—discourse depends on an 'internal' connection between utterances and the speaker’s broader intentions and experiences. The inclusion of cultural context such as literature and songs further accentuates this richness, suggesting a unified dimension that transcends discrete language games. Thus, Rhees argued, Wittgenstein’s analogy minimizes language’s fundamentally shared, meaning-making character which cannot be fully encapsulated by functional analogies. this perspective resonates with Rhee's recurrent conviction that language is not disjointed simply because it lacks one singular form; rather, the interplay among diverse contexts is what forges meaning. He suggested that it might be more accurate to liken language to an ongoing conversation: not all language is dialogue, but dialogue vividly demonstrates how meaning emerges.

Rhees approached religious matters in a similar vein, insisting that religious discourse resonates with many facets of life within culture. He argued that modern philosophy too frequently isolates belief from common conversation. In contrast, Rhees maintained that religious declarations acquire significance through their impact on how people actually live and  their use of everyday language involving concepts like 'trust' and 'forgiveness.' In this manner, he pre-emptively countered later accusations of so-called ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’ by demonstrating that religious ideas are inextricably linked to secular discourse. For him, language enables shared understanding provided its participants remain sincere and engaged—a commitment to honesty that permeated his career, from the radical impulses of his youth to the deliberate, patient exchanges in Swansea. Rhees also emphasised the internal cohesion of religious life, positing that its transformative power is inseparable from the language of worship and devotion. He argued that religious speech does more than merely embellish an underlying experience—it actively helps constitute that experience. Thus, a declaration such as “God exists” should be interpreted as a profession of faith rather than a mere factual assertion. In everyday discourse about objects or events, words typically point 'outward' for verification. In the realm of religion, however, key terms (e.g. sin, redemption, prayer) possess an 'internal' grammar rooted in a religious way of life; understanding what 'sin' means requires one to be embedded in a moral and confessional practice rather than simply labelling an external phenomenon for measurement. By drawing an analogy with love—where the 'language of love' is integral to the very nature of love—Rhees drew attention to the fact that religious language is equally essential to a believer’s life, such that the notion of 'the same God' reflects the continuity of communal worship rather than pointing to a single object. This perspective shows why religion cannot be confined within a rigid fact–fiction dichotomy: its grammar situates it outside the bounds of standard evidentiary discourse, aligning it instead with a way of life rooted in prayer, shared practices, and narrative worship. Consequently, attempts to reduce religion to science, psychology, or sociology overlook a fundamental dimension of lived experience, and efforts to separate religious morality from its theological source miss the inherently embedded nature of its ethical teachings. Ultimately, for Rhees, religion was neither a misguided science nor purely expressive but a life-encompassing practice in which 'God talk' is irreplaceable and is not amenable to verification in the same manner as ordinary statements about the world.

Opting for early retirement in 1966, Rhees later led seminars at King’s College London at the invitation of Peter Winch. Although he eventually relocated to Cambridgeshire, he returned to Swansea despite declining health, driven by a desire for the invigorating dialogues he regarded as his "only medicine.” Once he became too ill to host weekly seminars, Rhees’ health deteriorated rapidly. He passed away at his home on 22 May 1989, just as a Festschrift titled Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars—edited by Winch and D Z Phillips—was nearing publication.

In the aftermath of his death, Swansea’s Department of Philosophy acquired his extensive archives—only to discover, much to everyone’s astonishment, that Rhees’s so-called “nothing” amounted to sixteen thousand pages of notes, correspondence, and manuscripts. He had recorded his reflections nearly every day, engaging with arguments he encountered, replying to acquaintances, and systematically examining Greek philosophy, logic, ethical theory, political issues, aesthetics, theology, and the works of the French mystical philosopher and social activist Simone Weil. 

In contemporary times, Rhees’s legacy endures via the editions he curated of Wittgenstein’s classic writings, his own anthologies, and the manuscripts that continue to be studied in the Swansea University Rush Rhees Collection archive. His student and colleague at Swansea, D. Z. Phillips, played a pivotal role in the editorial curation of Rhees’ posthumous publications. Among the posthumous compiled and released  under the guidance of Phillips’s were Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy (1997), Discussions of Simone Weil,(2000) and the two-part In Dialogue with the Greeks (2004).

In such work many readers find in Rhees an uncommon blend of humility, rigor, and an unwavering refusal to compromise. By interweaving the insights of Plato, Brentano, Weil and Wittgenstein into his thought, Rhees demonstrated how philosophy can transcend temporal boundaries and bridge the gap between ancient and modern ideas. He was the kind of educator whose commitment to discussion reshaped an entire department’s culture, fostering an atmosphere of openness and inquiry. Rush Rhees embodied the notion that philosophy is an ongoing conversation in which every earnest speaker has something valuable to contribute—and that such disciplined, truth-seeking dialogue ultimately nurtures the life of the mind. His story stands as a lasting testament to an individual who, despite never proclaiming personal triumphs, left an indelible mark on modern thought.

Recommended further reading:

Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars (1989)

“According to Wittgenstein, philosophical puzzles are due to deep prejudices about language. In this collection of essays, in honour of Rush Rhees, philosophers investigate the hold such prejudices have on us in a number of closely related areas of philosophical enquiry.”

Sense and Reality: Essays out of Swansea (2009) John Edelman (ed.)

“This book is a collection of essays each of which discusses the work of one of eight individuals - Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, R. F. Holland, J. R. Jones, H. O. Mounce, D. Z. Phillips, Ilham Dilman and R.W. Beardsmore - who taught philosophy at the University of Wales, Swansea, for some time from the 1950s through to the 1990s and so contributed to what in some circles came to be known as 'the Swansea School'. These eight essays are in turn followed by a ninth that, drawing on the previous eight, offers something of a critical overview of philosophy at Swansea during that same period. The essays are not primarily historical in character. Instead they aim at both the critical assessment and the continuation of the sort of philosophical work that during those years came to be especially associated with philosophy at Swansea, work that is deeply indebted to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein but also distinctively sensitive to the relevance of literary works to philosophical reflection.”

Selected Bibliography

Books

Without Answers (1969) 

Discussions of Wittgenstein (1970) 

Posthumous Nachlass works:

Rush Rhees On Religion and Philosophy (1997) 

Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse (1998)

Moral Questions (1999) 

Discussions of Simone Weil (1999) 

Wittgenstein's On Certainty: There - Like Our Life (2003) 

In Dialogue with the Greeks (2004) 

Major co-edited works by Wittgenstein:

Philosophical Investigations, (1953), (with G.E.M. Anscombe)

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, (1956), (with G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe)

The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, (1958) 

Philosophical Remarks, (1974), (with R. Hargreaves and R. White)

Philosophical Grammar, (1975), (with A. Kenny)