TheSwanseaSchool.org

The Nature and Emergence of the Swansea School

While the expression ‘Swansea School of Philosophy’ might seem to suggest some kind of overarching doctrinal framework, in reality the philosophers who came to gather in Swansea never created or taught an official ‘manifesto’ which united them all. Also they did not invent such a label for themselves. Rather, they were unified by a common passion for non-theoretical philosophical inquiry, a willingness to challenge dominant intellectual trends, and a distinctive personal and collaborative style centred on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s spirit of philosophising which focussed on ‘attention to particulars.’ Key philosophical figures like Rush Rhees, D. Z. Phillips, Peter Winch, Roy Holland, J. R. Jones, Howard Mounce, Ilham Dilman, R. W. Beardsmore and Mario Von Der Ruhr were shaped by—and in turn contributed to—a characteristic mode of philosophical investigation under the auspices of what was then known as ‘University College Swansea’ between the 1950’s and early 2000’s. While calling such a heterogeneous assembly a ‘school’ risks diminishing the complexity of viewpoints among its members, the term became widely adopted in reference to Swansea due to the unique character of discourse that emerged there.

The Swansea School adopted a Wittgensteinian methodology that prioritized description over explanation, favouring an exploration of the myriad language-games and specific contexts in which words acquire meaning. Its members refused confinement to fixed stances, instead recognizing a “family resemblance” among diverse philosophical perspectives rather than any uniform theoretical commitments. The group also opposed attempts to reduce philosophy to a single technique or to a series of theories and declarations about the nature of existence. Their impatience with conventional ontological and epistemological labels such as ‘idealism’ and ‘rationalism’ emphasises a key aspect of the Swansea approach: a pronounced wariness of simplistic categorization in philosophical investigation.

Personal Engagement and a Focus on Particulars

A pivotal element linking the Swansea thinkers was the conviction that philosophy demands a profoundly personal involvement. Rather than a merely academic exercise, philosophical inquiry was treated as a transformative journey. Drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s philosophical mandate to dispel the confusions that distort our thinking, the school cultivated the attitude that the philosophical process is less about uncovering deep aspects of an external reality and more about examining and clarifying our own thought patterns. Wittgenstein once remarked that “Work on philosophy…is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things.” (Culture and Value, p. 24). Such a strategy reminds us that the pursuit of philosophy is not restricted to detached, ivory-tower speculation; it also involves contending with the trials of everyday experience and a continual confrontation of deep-rooted intellectual temptations. At Swansea, personal doubts, occupational hurdles, and intermittent missteps were frankly acknowledged. Mentorship and fellowship were regarded not as superfluous indulgences but as crucial conditions for the pursuit of philosophical perspicuity. Members of the Swansea School frequently examined their own assumptions, seeking to identify where they might be making hasty or superficial judgments. This form of clarificatory introspection underpinned philosophical practice, demanding humility and in particular a continual readiness to reassess one’s own unique assumptions. As Wittgenstein reminds us, these assumptions can act "like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off." (Philosophical Investigations, §103)

In this vein the Swansea philosophers remained alert to Wittgenstein’s caution against the relentless pursuit of all-encompassing generalizations. Wittgenstein maintained that if philosophers continually search for common features in every broad concept—and if they mimic the inquiry and response methods of science—it inevitably leads to baseless metaphysical conjecture and ultimately disorients the thinker. Moreover such an 'essentialist' stance might be interpreted not merely as a yearning for universality but also, by the same token, as a dismissive attitude toward particular instances. Philosophers of the Swansea School adopted this guidance with sincerity and their approach, pioneered by Rush Rhees, often stressed concrete examples, everyday language usage, and an exploration of the intricate, contextual facets of human interaction. Indeed Rhees, whose academic path was marked by highs and lows, epitomized the human side of the life-long philosophical journey. His episodes of self-doubt, professional turbulence, and reliance on peer-support remind us that effective philosophers are not detached intellects operating in vacuo but individuals navigating life’s uncertainties within society. As Wittgenstein once put it, “We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (Philosophical Investigations, §107).The mentoring network established in Swansea was crucial in keeping these thinkers anchored in valuable nuanced philosophical investigations that were seldom lucrative or widely recognized outside their immediate circles.

This focus on personal experience, ethical contemplation and the individual journey of understanding also extended to a broader critique of contemporary culture. Wittgenstein’s pointed observation, “People nowadays think scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them, that never occurs to them” (Culture and Value, p. 42), reverberated within the Swansea circle. There they opposed the cultural presumption that intellectual progress resided solely in scientific breakthroughs, opting instead to explore how art, literature, and even ostensibly trivial everyday experiences might offer philosophical illumination. By staying open to the humble or neglected facets of life—such as ordinary conversations, moral quandaries, or the impact of one’s own background—the Swansea School illuminated philosophical nuances that a more rigid methodology might dismiss as inconsequential.

Collaborative Immersion, Religion and Literature

Instead of delivering structured lectures, Swansea School philosophers often opted for spontaneous colloquia where there was immediacy of engagement; and where one could clarify—or challenge—one another’s notions. In Swansea, a shared understanding prevailed: both pupils and colleagues might encounter obstacles—yet with attempts at mutual clarification, progress toward a deeper comprehension of seemingly intractable philosophical particulars became more achievable. This approach, combined with the conviction that philosophers should not shy away from personal openness, resulted in exchanges at Swansea that were sometimes confrontational, unpolished and unguarded—yet as Dilman put it "I must say that we had a lot of serious trouble in the department. We made light of the infighting and survived." (Philosophy as Criticism, Introduction X)

In Swansea, philosophy was far from a mere scholarly pastime; it bore an intimate, transformative quality that could in some sense be described as spiritual or existential—yet unanchored to any established religious doctrine. In fact, the Swansea School encompassed individuals with divergent personal convictions, ranging from firm atheism through to orthodox Christian affiliations. Nonetheless, religion was seriously treated as a ubiquitous element of human existence warranting careful consideration. Even amid the internal disagreements mentioned above, the group concurred on the fundamentally significant role that religious life plays for many. Conventional tactics such as scientific reductionism or the swift labelling of religious assertions as factually or historically true / false seemed inadequate to their approach. A more fruitful alternative was a perspicuous investigation into how religious concepts operated within a believer’s world, probing their links to ritual, communal identity, and moral frameworks. This strategy placed many in the Swansea School outside the confines of both categorical ‘realism’ and ‘nonrealism,’ revealing a more nuanced, context-sensitive method for interpreting religious language. Rather than advocating for or against religious assertions in abstract terms, members of the School often analysed the grammar of religious dialogue—the kind of language used by both believers and sceptics—and inquired into its operation in daily life. Their recognition that religion might constitute a significant aspect of many lives did not amount to unqualified endorsement but rather reflected a regard for the plurality of human expression.

A further dimension of Swansea’s academic milieu was its heartfelt immersion in literature. This participation was not embarked upon solely for artistic pleasure; instead, it also functioned as a pathway to probe moral issues and existential quandaries. Key members of the Swansea School including Phillips, Winch, Holland, and Dilman devoted considerable effort to examining how literary works might offer insight into human conflicts, moral decisions, and suffering in ways that conventional philosophical argumentation sometimes could not. The Swansea School regarded literature as a reservoir of ‘real examples’ that yielded a granularity of insight unachievable in  oversimplified moralistic or theoretical accounts. In doing so, they carried forward Wittgenstein’s notion that meaning arises from usage, frequently manifesting more clearly in lived narratives than in abstract theorising.

The Swansea School’s emphasis on the importance of participatory, discussion-oriented teaching often led to intimate seminars, after-hours gatherings, and informal exchanges rather than to large lecture halls. The mode fostered in these settings was often Socratic—relying on probing questions, retorts, and the gradual emergence of mutual understanding in the friction of the discourse of ideas. Students at Swansea often recall being guided into subtle distinctions that compelled them to think independently rather than passively absorb a preferred system of philosophical ‘knowledge.’ This methodology resonated with Wittgenstein’s own hesitations and preferences concerning classroom communication. Likewise, the School maintained that the finest philosophy frequently appears as subtle reminders rather than grandiose proclamations. In this way philosophical clarification may best be pursued methodically, one step at a time, amid the complexities of lived experience. 

Enduring Methodological Legacy

In more recent times, the wider academic community has begun to recognise the Swansea School as a bastion of Wittgenstein-inspired inquiry. In many respects, the Swansea stance served as a counterpoint to the prevalent trends in modern philosophy, which typically demote ethical or existential concerns to a subservient position in relation to strict analytical or empirical methods. The Swansea School never dismissed the importance of logic or critical analysis; rather, they refused to let these tools overshadow the intricacies and subtleties inherent in the human condition that shape language and culture.

Philosophers of the Swansea School also maintained that achieving philosophical understanding is a perennial endeavour and that every new generation must recapture clarity for itself rather than depend on an established corpus of knowledge. This reluctance to systematize or bring ultimate conclusions to philosophical inquiry may be frustrating to those seeking final answers, yet it resonates with the profoundly personal character of their thought—where the perspective of each individual holds distinct significance. In this context one is reminded of Nietzsche’s remark “each person must have his own opinion about everything about which it is possible to have an opinion, because he himself is a special, unique thing that holds new, previously non-existent view about all other things.” (Human All Too Human, §286).

References

Dilman, I. (2011) Philosophy as Criticism. NY: Continuum.

Nietzsche, F. (1878) Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Leipzig: E. W. Fritzsch. 

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 

Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Culture and Value. London: Faber and Faber.
 

Recommended reading:

Sense and Reality: Essays out of Swansea (2009) John Edelman (ed.)

“This book is a collection of essays each of which discusses the work of one of eight individuals - Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, R. F. Holland, J. R. Jones, H. O. Mounce, D. Z. Phillips, Ilham Dilman and R.W. Beardsmore - who taught philosophy at the University of Wales, Swansea, for some time from the 1950s through to the 1990s and so contributed to what in some circles came to be known as 'the Swansea School'. These eight essays are in turn followed by a ninth that, drawing on the previous eight, offers something of a critical overview of philosophy at Swansea during that same period. The essays are not primarily historical in character. Instead they aim at both the critical assessment and the continuation of the sort of philosophical work that during those years came to be especially associated with philosophy at Swansea, work that is deeply indebted to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein but also distinctively sensitive to the relevance of literary works to philosophical reflection.”